recession, coupled with the sense that America was losing its dominant place in the world order, resulted in the country entering into an era of intense cultural introspection with the nuclear family becoming synonymous with the 'aspirations of the American Century' (Zaretsky 2007, p.6) . The recession of 1974-5 had resulted in widespread male unemployment and, according to Zaretsky, fears over a new kind of masculinity within the workplace: 'the freewheeling, antiauthoritarian new worker gave way to that of the fallen male breadwinner, emasculated by plant-closings and corporate downsizing' (Zaretsky 2007, p.137) . At the same time attention was trained on the rise of two-earner families and the changes in gender roles that were partly attributed to new social movements like feminism and gay liberation which were seen to undermine the family's normative heterosexual configuration (Zaretsky 2007, p.2) . Media accounts 'focused on the deleterious effects of downsizing and plant closings on the nation's male industrial workers' (Zaretsky 2007, p.138) and it was widely reported that unemployment had a far worse psychological effect on men than on women (Zaretsky 2007, p.138) .
iii In many ways the events of the late 1970s provide a context for attitudes towards the family, and gender roles regularly found in newspaper reporting since then, particularly those media accounts that portray the unemployed man as 'rudderless and emasculated, his family torn apart by a sudden and unexpected economic vulnerability that not only robbed him of his livelihood but added insult to injury by forcing his wife out of the home and into the workforce' (Zaretsky 2007, p.138) . With both Britain and America arguably still suffering the effects of the past decade -the stockmarket crash of 2000, the terrible events of 9/11, the resulting war on terror and the latest global recession -it is not surprising that newspaper reporting on austerity measures and the family are noticeably similar to those of the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, as shown by financial analyst Doug Wakefield's research into the stock market crash of 2008, there are many parallels that can be drawn between the build up to both the 1987 and 2008 recessions (Wakefield 2008 ). His conclusion is that, as a society, we would do well to learn the lessons of financial history in order to avoid its future pitfallsa lesson that should also be heeded when considering the gendered bias contained in newspaper reporting on the effects of the recession in both North America and Britain.
Faludi's 1992 book convincingly argued that from time immemorial the feminist movement had been held to account for 'nearly every woe besetting women, from mental depression to meagre savings accounts, from teenage suicides to eating disorders to bad complexions' and that this anti-feminist backlash followed a pattern (Faludi 1992, p.3 ' (in Faludi 1992, p.103) . In fact the history of backlash is not unique to America or even to recent history as, according to Faludi, every time women achieve a modicum of success in their battle for equality, a backlash occurs. A phenomenon that can even be dated back to 'the rise of restrictive property laws and penalties for unwed and childless women of ancient Rome, the heresy judgements against female disciples of the early Christian Church, or the mass witch burnings of medieval Europe' (Faludi 1992, p.67) .
Looking back to the post World War II era, for example, Faludi tells us that the 'much publicized homebound image of the fifties woman bore little relation to her actual circumstances' (Faludi 1992, p.74) . Cautioning us to be wary -even of seminal texts like Betty
Friedan's The Feminine Mystique, with their focus on the plight of bored and depressed white, middle-class, women -Faludi reveals that: 'While 3.25 million women were pushed or persuaded out of industrial jobs in the first year after the end of the Second World War, 2.75 million women were entering the work force at the same time' (Faludi 1992, p.74) . Despite
Friedan's focus on the 'problem that has no name' the underlying and relatively un-reported problem was, argues Faludi, that women were entering more menial jobs than ever before, admin and clerical positions that were lower down the salary scale and with little or no career prospects. And while it is true that by 1947 women had managed to recoup the number of jobs lost to them in the immediate post-war years, with more women employed 'by 1952 […] than at the height of the war' (Faludi 1992, p.74) , public opinion toward women working outside the home had changed:
The culture derided them; employers discriminated against them; government promoted new employment policies that discriminated against women; and eventually women themselves internalized the message that, if they must work, they should stick to typing.
[…] The fifties backlash, in short, didn't transform women into full-time 'happy housewives', it just demoted them to poorly paid secretaries (Faludi 1992, p.75 ).
This change of perception towards working women and the anti-feminist uproar that ensued was, argues Faludi, fuelled by women's 'unrelenting influx into the job market, not a retreat to the home' (Faludi 1992, p.75) Faludi 1992, p.85) . Presumably at the same time as they retreated into the home -multitasking as they went.
ii … and now
By the end of the 1980s, according to Faludi, recession polls revealed that men were of the opinion that the women's movement had 'made things harder for men at home' (Faludi 1992, p.83) and that the family should be 'traditional' (Faludi 1992, p.82 (Faludi 1992, p.87) then it is not difficult to comprehend the impact on masculinity that is compounded with each recession and each round of job losses. Particularly bearing in mind attitudes unearthed in the Yankelovich Monitor survey, which, over a twentyyear period leading up to the 1980s, found that the leading definition of masculinity for men overwhelmingly remains 'being a good provider for his family' (Faludi 1992, p.87) .
Recalling the way newspapers reported the physical and psychological decline of unemployed men in the 1970s recession is instructive here as journalists asserted that the 'physical impact of the plant closings on newly unemployed men found that they disproportionately suffered from increased rates of alcoholism, mental illness, suicide, heart disease, ulcers, and sexual impotence' (Zaretsky 2007, p.138) . Some thirty years later recent North American media reports have taken the same route by claiming that: '"the financial strain of unemployment" is worse for the mental health of men than women' with lengthy 'periods of unemployment [being] a strong predictor of heavy drinking, especially for men ages 27 to 35' (Salam 2009 ). According to journalists such as Salam the lack of prospects for the white male is already leading to, among many other social problems, a decrease in the amount of marriages on offer to 27-35 year-olds (Salam 2009 ). Adding fuel to this particular fire is the prediction that this crisis is already beginning to unfold in the American working class family which 'is slowly turning into a matriarchy, with men increasingly absent from the home and women making all the decisions' (Rosin 2010) . In addition, according to Rosin, this is a pattern that has already been seen in the families of 'lower-class African Americans: the mothers pull themselves up, but the men don't follow. First-generation college-educated white women may join their black counterparts in a new kind of middle class, where marriage is increasingly rare' (Rosin 2010) . Again this is nothing new as this particular fear had already been voiced during the 1970s when, according to Zaretsky, the 'anxiety that middle-and upper-class families were coming to resemble their poorer counterparts was accompanied by the related fear that the ostensibly stable divide between white and black families were breaking down' (Rosin 2010, p.13) . Quite apart from the ramifications of this kind of attitude towards racial segregation (imagined or not) it seems that the US print media would have us believe that, due to the latest global recession, the white middle-class North American family is in the midst of a crisis of seismic proportions. Unbeknownst to the general reader, however, this crisis is nothing new and has been repeated each time a recession hits the industrial sector.
This view is compounded by journalists such as Caryl Rivers who claims that 'whenever white men can't get jobs -or can't get the jobs they feel they are entitled to, and when they imagine "others" taking those jobs, there is often hell to pay' (Rivers 2010) . It maybe women, and feminists in particular, that are at the receiving end of male anger nowadays but a cursory look at the history of populist rage, according to Rivers, reveals the 'incendiary situation' that inevitably arises when white men cannot get employed. A situation that reportedly leads to: 'Angry, unemployed white men tend[ing] to look around and blame blacks, Hispanics, immigrants and others for taking "their" jobs -even when minority men are unemployed at a high rate as well' (Rivers 2010 (EOC), after undertaking a two-year study into pregnancy discrimination at work, came to the conclusion that the situation was much worse than they had expected, that an estimated 30,000 women a year lose their jobs as a result of pregnancy and the fact that women with children are increasingly finding themselves at the receiving end of renewed (and law breaking) discrimination (EOC 2005) it seems disingenuous for Hakim to claim that: 'Sex differentials in the professions are due primarily to substantively different work orientations and career choices among men and women' (Hakim 2011) . It is equally disingenuous for author, family expert and policy analyst Jill Kirby to argue that this disparity in the workplace 'has nothing to do with discrimination' but is due to '"the fact that women become less committed to the workplace at the point in their lives when they have children. They want to spend more time with their children, and regard lower pay as a trade-off for family time"' (in (Allen 2011) but is it really a choice when the stark truth is that working tax credits, which used to cover 80 per cent of childcare costs, have been cut to 70 per cent in a country that has nearly the most expensive childcare in the world? Add to that the devastating effect that benefit cuts are having on single parent families who are not only losing 'services equivalent to 18.5% of their income' (Women's Budget Group 2010) but are being paid considerably less than their childless counterparts (£474 mean income per week compared to £674 for single adult in work) (Cribb et al. 2012, p.25) and it is clear that the latest recession will not only have a major impact on children and families but will also have a lasting affect on 'women's long-term career prospects' (Allen 2011). 
… And the sting in the tail
One of the reoccurring problems is that, whether British or American, women's wages are increasingly vital to the family budget. And yet while there continues to be a lack of parity in earned income it will always be women's wages that are sacrificed to childcare costs.
Women's biology may be used as a reason for them to stay home but it is their earning power that encouraged the strong mother-child bond and the second (from the 1920s) focusing 'on an eroticized couple relationship, demanding that mothers curb emotional "overinvestment"
in their children' (Coontz 1992, p.9) . This contradictory image of the idealised white middle class woman within a 'traditional' family, was not only promulgated to encourage nationalism during World War II but was later used: 'to sell washing machines, cake mixes, deodorants, detergents, rejuvenating face-creams, hair tints' (pp. 63-4) and was further utilised to promote the ideal of the American dream.
Looking back over the history of the family it is plain to see how social and cultural changes have historically distorted opinions on parenting. Industrialisation and World War II are prime examples of how, when the economy changed, so did the expectations of both women's and men's roles within it and the family. Society may have determined that women work to help the war effort, but it was equally as forthright in its determination to get them back into the home when the men returned victorious and unemployed. By the end of the 1950s, and despite the reality of women's working practices, according to Betty Friedan, the term '"career woman" had become a dirty word in America' (Friedan 1992, p.42) and middle class women were increasingly urged by the media to relinquish paid work to look after hearth and home while their men earned a family wage. Aided and abetted by newspaper and magazine admonitions to 'do the right thing' this attitude has continued since the post-War period. And yet one thing has remained constant: since the split between the public and private sphere brought about by industrialisation, masculinity has increasingly been defined by men's ability to support a family while femininity remains linked to women's reproductive capacity.
As we have seen, the gendered nature of backlash reporting and 'trend journalism' conceals the reality behind a recession's effect on the population with women continuing to suffer from a higher global unemployment rate than men. Long-standing inequalities in the gender distribution of economic and financial resources have placed women at a disadvantage relative to men in their capability to participate in, contribute to and benefit from broader processes of development. Despite considerable progress on many aspects of women's economic empowerment through, inter alia, increases in educational attainment and share of paid work, deeply entrenched inequality persists as a result of discriminatory norms and practices, and the pace of change has been slow and uneven across regions (DESA 2009, p.v) .
This same report goes onto assert that:
The manner in which countries respond to the recession can have disproportionate impacts on women and girls, possibly reversing gains made, particularly through cuts in public spending on health and education and through inequitably designed safety nets. There is also increased risk of reductions in allocations to gender equality and women's empowerment (DESA 2009, p.24 ).
In addition, backlash reporting ignores the devastating effect that the global recession has had on Hispanic and black working class men and their families in America. Indeed, despite all of the scaremongering in the American press, US unemployment is now down to pre-recession levels: except for African Americans who, despite enjoying a fall of unemployment rates in January 2012 to 13.16 percent 'remains significantly higher than the 8.5 percent rate of November 2007, just prior to the recession' (U.S. Dept of Labor 2012, p.1) and whose unemployment rates remain the largest of all groups. Unemployment remains a problem in America, as it does in Britain, but the fact remains that the focus on white male unemployment in the US media masks the more pressing issues relating to race, class and female unemployment that have emerged through the latest round of job cuts.
This recession is much like any. Jobs come and go. It may well be true that the bluecollar trades are slowly being replaced and that 'thinking and communicating have come to eclipse physical strength and stamina as the keys to economic success' (The Economist 2011) but the fact remains that all the time the family is imagined 'traditionally', while wage and employment equality remains just out of reach and while the world of work is organised into male dominated industries and female ones, there will be inequality both between male and female employees, black and white, working and middle-class and between mothers and nonmothers. In addition, backlash and trend reporting obfuscates one of the many real issues at stake: that childcare and maternity leave are vital for a nation's economic growth. It seems that families in post-recession Britain are now making the same choices as those made by young Americans in the 1980s when, by delaying marriage and childbirth and by having less children, they chose to 'preserve many of trappings of the postwar economic dream by sacrificing many aspects of the postwar family dream' (Coontz 1992, p.266) , emphasis in original). For journalist Polly Toynbee: 'Family friendly policies are seen as lollypops for women voters, not as economic necessity' but 'States need more people and parents want more babies' (Toynbee 2012) . Indeed, if Toynbee is to be believed: 'Making it easy for women to combine work and family is essential for the nation's standard of living: babies are a longterm economic necessity too. Countries that make combining both easy, do best' (Toynbee 2012) . A fact that we would do well to remember when reading newspaper reports about the gendered nature of job losses and their effect on families on both sides of the Atlantic.
i In a world where the print media is suffering falling sales, a cynic might suggest that this kind of copy also trades on middle class angst in order to sell newspapers. The Washington Post admitted as much in 2007 when reporting on the agenda behind the mommy wars by saying: 'The ballyhooed Mommy Wars exist mainly in the minds -and the marketing machines -of the media and publishing industry, which have been churning out mom vs. mom news flashes since, believe it or not, the 1950s' (Graff 2007) .
ii With only 60 per cent finding new jobs 'about half at lower pay' (Faludi 1992 p87) .
iii Presaging the contents of Reihan Salam's report of 2009 (more on this later). iv Which covers over thirty nations and has been running for eleven years.
